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Appellant submits the following Reply Brief in response 
to Respondents Brief in response to Respondent's Brief. 
2QIB2-J 
VESTED PROPERTY INTEREST CANNOT BE CREATED 
BY STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WHEN IT UNDERMINES 
AND DESTROYS PUBLIC POLICY ON UNCLAIMED 
PROPERTY AS ESTABLISHED BY THE LEGISLATURE 
THROUGH A LAW PASSED SUBSEQUENT TO PASSAGE 
OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
In 1957 the Utah Legislature in effect repudiated the 
doctrine of escheat by establishing and endorsing a new concept 
known as the Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property law. 
This, in effect, requires all corporations or business holding 
funds or property belonging to an owner they cannot locate, to 
turn it over to the Utah State Treasurer. He, basically, "stands 
in the shoes of the owner" and holds for him. 
Owners or their heirs wno file claims are paid and the 
unclaimed balance is used for public purposes by being deposited 
in the Uniform School Fund. Owners or heirs, without any 
limitation of time, may come forward and claim a refund of all 
that is being held. A trust fund has been established 
sufficiently large to enable all claims to be paid. In the case 
of money orders cashed by Travelers Express after having been 
reported as unclaimed property and the funds paid in, repayment 
will be made by the Treasurer's Office upon submission of the 
cashed money order. 
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While the basic question to be decided in this case is 
whether the six-year Statute of Limitations applies, or whether 
the later passed law setting a seven-year presumption of 
abandonment statutory period overrules the six-year period. 
However, a deeper underlying question is really whether the 
Uniform Unclaimed Property Law can be circumvented and public 
policy be thwarted by the use of the Statute of Limitations to 
permit corporate escheat. 
A basic concept is that escheat is not favored in the 
law. Recently Jix.iJa£-J&a±J^  
3XULlteXS>lA-2*~Xa£ZjL-AS£&aB£Ai 659 P.2d 1052 (Utah 1983) this 
court overruled a past precedent to give an estate to heirs who 
showed up many years after escheat ordinarily occurred. If the 
court upholds the respondent in this case, it will be permitting/ 
even affirming, the doctrine of escheat in a different form, 
namely corporate escheat. 
Corporate escheat, if permitted, will divert funds from 
public purposes, and ultimately from owners or heirs just as 
effectively as public escheat will divert funds from owners and 
their heirs. 
- 2 -
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PfilfflLJJ 
TRAVELERS EXPRESS COMPANY, INC. MAY NOT 
BE SELECTIVE IN APPLYING STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS ONLY TO STATE AND NOT TO OTHER _ . . 
OWNERS SUBJECT TO UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT, 
AND NOT APPLYING TO OWNERS WHO CASH MONEY 
ORDERS AFTER SIX YEARS. 
The appellants contend that when money orders are 
purchased and issued that they are subject to the six-year 
Statute of Limitations, and that at the end of six years, the 
holder has a vested right in the funds. 
Two questions immediately come to mind. (1) Is 
Travelers Express Company taking the position that all of its 
money orders sold within the State of Utah are good for only six 
years? (2) Will Travelers Express Company refuse to cash any 
money order older than six years for any customer? 
A resounding nnon answer is so obvious that it hardly 
needs to be mentioned. Nowhere in the record is there any 
evidence that money orders are not honored by Travelers Express 
after six years, except those claimed by the State Treasurer 
under the Unclaimed Property Law. No time limits are ever 
brought to the buyer's attention. 
After asserting the statute, ±Jc&X£^htt^b££ix~3~y3lX££-££ 
JLi when any time barred money orders have been cashed older than 
six years. The defense of the Statute of Limitations may not be 
asserted against the State of Utah, and then waived against 
owners of money orders who present them for payment after six 
years. The issuing company cannot observe a double standard. 
- 3 -
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This principle was the central point in the 
c a s e of £ £ u i J i - £ 3 X £ l i i ^ 
LAfJLIllSUX3J}££~£Qm£anx, 221 S.E.2d 522 (1975). 
It is clear from the records that the 
respondent would never attempt a forfeiture 
against a policy holder, and that the point 
is now raised only as against the Tax 
Commission. The derivative nature of the 
Commission's rights under the act must be 
considered. If the owner of presumed 
abandoned property has any rights, which are 
conceded by Metropolitan these rights accrue 
in their entirety to the commission. 
M^LQ^Qllt&XL.m^^IXQir^MSd^&^itS^SQI^I^^Xr^^l 
Xi&££~&£~£Q~£h£££^2Qli£i££~&$^ns£^£h£ 
pjDlJ^XJtelite^ 
Il$)&S~^^n££~£b£~Tax~£QimiSSiQ&. (Emphasis 
added. ) 
The case further stated . . . "Both in law and equity 
forfeitures are abhorredf but by the same token waivers are 
favored." 
The same would be true of forfeited money orders to 
Travelers Express. It would bring about corporate escheat. On 
the other hand, the waiver doctrine would protect the funds for 
the true owners, and would be returned to the owner by the State 
Treasurer when claimed. 
Also, another case applying the waiver doctrine stated: 
It is probable that the bank would never 
attempt such a forfeiture against a 
traveler's check purchaser, and that the 
point is now raised only as against the 
controller. If this is so, the derivative 
nature of the controller's rights under the 
act must be born in mind. If the owner of 
presumed abandoned property has any rights, 
those rights accrue in their entirety to the 
controller. !&x£^bank„m3x~L&£~X3lX£~lic£ 
£QI&ia££UI^li2h££~££~±£~£~S£££ti&S££-££ 
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£Ql&££ll££* (Emphasis added.) 
Bank~Q£~M£Ji£3^X±~£xan£ten, 252 Cal.App.2d 208 (1967K_ 
The same conclusion was reached in a "money order" 
case. See £s>£XSjL~G£ld£n~S±a±£~Bank, Cal.App., 157 Cal.Rptr. 
538f 95 CA.3rd 360. 
In the recent case of Dsnnl£~Jji~B&b££££j.~IIj.~££sl±~XjL 
T££XSl£££~EX2£SJS£-.£Q]&&aJKi-t.-.In£' No. C.A. 80-4443 in the Superior 
Court of Rhode Island, June 17, 1982. Mr. Justice Albert E. 
DeRobbio after reviewing the evidence and nearing arguments in a 
summary judgment hearing stated the following in a transcript of 
his reasons for ftis decision as follows: 
A waiver is a voluntary and intentional 
relinquishment of a known right, claim or 
privilege. . . . This court concurs with the 
findings of the California court in the case 
of 2£3X£l£££^Ex&££££ against £££%, number 
77-1086R, decided January 8, 1980, that 
Travelers has waived such a service charge. 
And I quote the language from that case, 
"Since the controller's rights under 
California's Unclaimed Property Law are 
derivative and he succeeds to whatever rights 
the owners of abandoned property have, the 
waiver of service charges by plaintiff as to 
the owners in any event defeats any rignt 
Travelers might seek to assert against the 
controller." 
The court's order signed by Justice DeRobbio on July 
9, 1982 stated: 
#4. Travelers Express has never attempted to 
collect these service charges from owners or 
payees of the money orders regardless of when 
presented for payment, but has instead 
followed a practice of waiving such charges 
to all except the state. 
- 5 -
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In the present case on appeal, Travelers Express may 
not waive its assertion of the Statute of Limitation against 
individual money order owners and not waive this right against 
the State Treasurer* 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY DEMONSTRATES THAT THE 
UTAH UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT SUPERSEDES THE 
RUNNING OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
The original unclaimed property law passed in 1957 did 
not specifically, mention money orders, although we maintain tnat 
they were covered by Section 78-44-8, U.C.A. (1953) which covered 
"all intangible personal property not otherwise covered by this 
act. " 
A.Jgp££ifi£^ sm£J3dmeJDi-.iil-.1555 clearly showed the 
legislative intent of covering money orders when the specific 
words "money orders" were included. This was two years after 
Section 16 of the Uniform Act dealing with the Statute of 
Limitations was omitted at the passage of the Uniform Unclaimed 
Property Act in 1957. 
The Legislature certainly would not have amended in 
these words through passage of a specific bill if it would have 
been a useless and meaningless gesture. It would have been 
totally without purpose if the Legislature had intended to 
continue to recognize the six-year Statute of Limitations. 
This 1959 amendment shows the clear intent of the 
Legislature that money orders were to be covered by the unclaimed 
- 6 -
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property law, and that companies issuing money orders must report 
those that were uncashed for seven years. 
Thus, the principle of legislative intent argued 
extensively by respondents in their brief that the Statute of 
Limitations was intended to supersede the effect of the Unclaimed 
Property Act has been totally demolished by the 1959 amendment, 
particularly in reference to money orders. Therefore, the 
extensive quote from the case of S£a££^Q£^I]£ah^£x^£3ljL^Bak3X~XjL 
Jni££m£im£ailk~Faimg££~&£SQ£i££lQnt 668 P.2d 503 (1983) is not in 
point nor applicable. The public policy to be concerned about is 
the unclaimed property disposition policy which is a successor to 
the old escheat policy, and it has a far higher priority than 
whether the Statute of Limitations should continue. 
A brief explanation of tne reference to a Bar by the 
Statute of Limitations in Section 78-44-11(5). U.C.A. (1953) and 
in Regulation #10 issued by the State Treasurer shortly after the 
1957 act was adopted needs to be explained. 
The State Treasurer has always upheld the principle of 
Jx.Sl.aBlLXjL~M££ll&££b, 61 Pac. 901 (Utah) that once the Statute of 
Limitations has fully run, and it has not been waived, it becomes 
a vested right. Therefore, in recognizing that the statute nad 
fully run on any property held by a nolder at least six years 
prior to the 1957 passage of the Uniform Unclaimed Property Act., 
In other words before 1951, there should have been placed in the 
law a passage which recognized this right, and stating that such 
was not reportable. That was the reason for Section 78-44-11(5), 
- 7 -
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and that was the reason for Regulation #10 so that these prior 
rights would be recognized and not excluded* However once the 
law had recognized these exceptions, the future reporting was 
done, the public policy of unclaimed property would have priority 
over the Statute of Limitations/ and no later vested rights 
tnrough that statute would accrue. Regulation #10 and subsection 
11(5) would no longer be relevant, and would become nullities. 
In summary, the case of ]]£a]o^e]L*X£l±-*3ak&X-2± 
In£££BD]}n£ailL.F&xm£X£~&J5SQ£i£iriQIl, £]1£X3, has been quoted 
extensively and heavily relied upon by respondents. However, 
such reliance is improper and faulty since such case was given 
tne following very narrow interpretation by this court. 
Since our conclusion tha t the s t a t e has 
no r ight to the custody of these patronage 
c r e d i t s i s based on the app l i cab i l i t y of the 
s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s to a pa r t i cu l a r type 
of property covered by a pa r t i cu l a r oylaw 
provision of the holder, we have no occasion 
to rule on other quest ions argued by the 
p a r t i e s . . . . W£^£l£Q^£X$xess~nQ~Q£ini£iL*.£& 
£h^avBli£&illte-s>£~Jkh^££aJui££-Q£ 
liirui^isjis^is-
£&hSX~±h£^£a£X£I&S£~.£X£&i£JS. (Emphasis 
added) . 
£QB£LU£IQ]$ 
Defendants-Appellants respectfully request the Court to 
reverse the decision of the District Court. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 16th day of November, 1984. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
f
 JOSEPH p. MCCARTHY 
Assistant Attorney General 
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This is to certify that I mailed two true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Reply Brief of Defendants-Appellants, 
postage prepaid, to L. Ridd Larson and Douglas Matsumori of Ray, 
Quinney & Nebeker, 400 Desert Building, Salt Lake City, OT 84111-
1996 this 16th day of November, 1984. 
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